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Expressed emotion and lithium prophylaxis
SIR: In a previous study (Priebe; Journal, March
1989, 154, 396â€”399),expressed emotion (EE) in key
relatives of 21 patients with bipolar affective or
schizoaffective psychoses was assessed by the
Camberwell Family Interview (CFI). All patients
had been on prophylactic lithium for at least three
years. Patients living with high-EE relatives showed a
significantly poorer response during the three years
before interview and particularly during the nine
month follow-up.
Twenty-eight months after the initial CFI, the key
relatives of 15 patients were re-interviewed. All 15
patients had continued on prophylactic lithium
throughout the 28 months. Two critical remarks
designated high EE. There were 10 relatives ident
ified with high EE in the first interview and eight in
the second, since two relatives changed from high- to
low-EE status. The course of patients' illness was
assessed by means of a morbidity index (Coppen et
al, 1973) reflecting severity and length of recurrences
(a recurrence was defined by hospital admission or a
temporary additional antidepressive or neuroleptic
medication).
Regardless of whether EE status was defined
according to first or second CFI, morbidity indices
concerning the 28-month period were more than six
times higher in patients living with high-EE relatives
(regarding the first CFI: t=2.9l, P<0.05; regarding
the second CFI: t = 3.83, P< 0.01). Four out of five
patients with consistently low-EE relatives, and one
patient with a relative who had changed from high
to low-EE status were virtually without any recur
rences during the 28-month period. This applied to
none of the patients living with consistently high-EE
relatives.
A clear answer as to whether high-EE status of
relatives leads to an unfavourable course of illness
or vice versa was not found. Both course of illness
and relatives' EE status might be influenced by inter
actional patterns in the patients' families, and by
changes in those patterns. As far as this small and
highly selective sample is concerned, it may be con
cluded that patients living with consistently low
EE relatives rarely need therapeutic interventions
of whatever kind in addition to prophylactic
lithium.
Department of Social Psychiatry
Freie UniversitÃ¢tBerlin
Platanenallee 19
D 1000 Berlin 19
Department of Clinical Psychiatry
Freie UniversitÃ¤tBerlin
Reference
S. PRIEBE
C. WILDGRUBE
COPPEN, H., PEST, M., BAILEY,J. etal(l973)Double-blind and open
prospective studies of lithium prophylaxis in affective disorders.
Psychiatry,NeurologyandNeurosurgery,76,501â€”510.
Pseudocyesis followed by depressive psychosis
SIR: Pseudocyesis is a false beliefin pregnancy associ
ated with its symptoms and signs (Cohen, 1982). It
may be associated with psychiatric disorder, most
commonly depression, which usually does not reach
case level (Brown & Barglow, 1971). Occasionally, it
is associated with psychosis (Taylor & Kreeger, 1987;
Mortimer & Banberry, 1988;Milner & Hayes, 1990).
We would like to report the first case of depressive
psychosis following pseudocyesis after an interlude
of normality.
Case report: A 38-year-old married domestic worker of
stablepre-morbid personality had children of ages20, 14
and 10years.Shehad had onemiscarriageat age35years
and one electiveabortion when 37 yearsold. Six months
after this abortion shewasreferredto the psychiatricser
vicesbecauseshebelievedherself to be pregnant,despite
two negativepregnancytests.Shehad missedtwo periods,
hadback-ache,breastswellingand tendernessandmorning
nausea.Examination revealeda distendedabdomenbut
non-pregnantcervix and uterus.After threeweeksof sup
portive psychotherapy all symptoms resolved. She
remainedcompletelywell for threeweeksbut then became
depressed,with early morning wakening, reducedenergy,
poor appetite and weight loss.Shewasseverelyagitated,
believingherselfto be in danger.Shewasdeludedthat her
facewasbeingdistortedand that herbody wasrotting. She
made three suicideattempts. Her symptomsfailed to re
spondto antidepressantsand phenothiazinesbut resolved
rapidly with a short courseof electroconvulsivetherapy.
She returned to her pre-morbid functioning and has
remainedwell for two yearsoff all medication.
Our patient's illness satisfied DSMâ€”IIIâ€”Rcriteria for
a major depressive episode with psychotic features
and ICDâ€”9 guidelines for manic-depressive psy
chosis, depressed type. To our knowledge, this is the
first report of a depressive psychosis following
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pseudocyesis and is the first case to demonstrate an
interval of normality between resolution of pseudo
cyesis and onset of psychotic symptoms. This case
highlights the necessity for adequate follow-up of
patients with pseudocyesis: severe psychiatric illness
may supervene even after a period of normality.
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Ethics of â€˜¿braintransplants'
Sir: O'Shea (Journal, August 1990, 157, 302) raises
the issue of brain transplants and their relation to the
ancient debate concerning mind and body. A number
of points seem worth making.
The hypothetical operation of transplanting A's
brain into B's body (and vice versa) was discussed
by Shoemaker (1963) and further elaborated by
Williams (1970) in connection with the problem of
personal identity. The issue initially appears to be
whether one believes that the self (however consti
tuted) will similarly be transferred with the brain or
will remain with the body. Williams shows that both
views can be cogently argued for, and discusses the
links between the issue of personal identity and that
of the relation of mind and brain.
It might be thought that such speculation was best
left to the realms of science fiction, but there are two
reasons for regarding discussion of such hypothetical
cases as important. Firstly, as O'Shea implies, less
dramatic forms of brain surgery already occur. One
example is that of commissurotomy for intractable
epilepsy. The philosophical difficulties raised by this
operation are addressed by Nagel (1976). He dis
cusses how many minds these patients can be said to
have and shows that the results of the operation tend
to break down our natural assumption that we (the
unoperated) have one mind.
A second reason for considering these operations
lies in the special way that they point up the links
between issues in the philosophy of mind and ethical
difficulties that are of particular relevance to psy
chiatry. Consider the question: How much change
does someone have to undergo before thay do not
exist any more (for example, removal of the brain
and replacement by another)? This now looks very
like the question that we ask and answer in cases of
brain death. From this point it is a small step to
considering cases of direct relevance to psychiatry
such as the dementing relative (â€œshe'snot herself
any moreâ€•)or the psychotic patient during a florid
episode (â€œhe'schanged beyond all recognitionâ€•).
O'Shea's informal poll of a number of psy
chiatrists produces much the same result as my own.
Most psychiatrists appear to hold either to a form of
materialistic behaviourism or to some kind of dual
istic position, and few are aware that the debate has
moved on considerably. Neither position is philo
sophically coherent (good critiques of both can be
found in Smith & Jones (1986)). Importantly, it
cannot be a matter of indifference that we hold inco
herent positions, since they do have practical conse
quences and lead to incoherent actions. An example
worth considering in this respect would be the ration
ale of offering a combination of psychotherapy and
medication for depressive illness. Whenever this
question is discussed it is clear that (often un
examined) assumptions about the philosophy of
mind are in operation.
We have begun to recognise that these issues are
important. A philosophy group has now been
formed within the College, and at my own hospital
we now hold regular philosophy meetings.
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